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This work focuses on Peter Singer’s book, One World: The Ethics of Globalisation, and a 
reading of it recently presented by M. Ali Khan. Khan’s response to Singer is acutely critical, 
but ultimately fails to situate Singer’s offering in its proper historical context. In this sense, 
Khan’s response is not sufficient. We demonstrate that Singer’s offering is permeated by a 
universalising discourse marked by asymmetric power relations clearly described by Edward 
Said in Orientalism and, more surprisingly, by Fyodor Dostoyevsky in The Possessed. We 
illustrate how Singer’s narrative and the counter-narrative of Khan represent a continuation of 
a longer historical disputation between the West and the East. 
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...It is a sign of the decay of nations when they begin to have gods in common. 
—Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1872)1 
 
...Political imperialism governs an entire field of study, imagination, and scholarly 
institutions—in such a way as to make its avoidance an intellectual and historical 
impossibility. 
—Edward Said (1979)2 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Communication, translation, domination, and dialogue: these are all different 
forms of interaction between individuals, each inherently possessing differing amounts of 
asymmetric power. In a recent essay, “Regional (East-West/North-South) Cooperation 
and Peter Singer’s Ethics of Globalisation” (We will refer to this essay as “KOS,” short 
for ‘Khan on Singer’),3 M. Ali Khan interprets and ultimately rejects Peter Singer’s 
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Hopkins University, Baltimore MD. 21218, USA. Sean Zeigler <smz@jhu.edu> is associated with the 
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1See Dostoyevsky’s chapter entitled “Night,” from The Possessed, reprinted in Dostoyevsky (1961). 
2See part II of Said’s The Edward Said Reader, entitled “Orientalism and After” from Said (2000). 
3We utilise this acronym to avoid unnecessary repetitive references to ‘Khan’.  However, the nature of 
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recent book. KOS focuses on the structural characteristics of national communication, 
global communication and philosophical communication in today’s world by explicating 
three diverse texts. The first (Hashwani’s letter) analyses the “current” state of the 
modern world from the context of a national perspective—Pakistani, more precisely. The 
second (Singer’s book) emphasises the state of the world from a global or “universal” 
perspective. The third (Badiou’s essay) is neither national nor global in nature but more 
properly philosophical. KOS examines all three works in great detail—word by word, 
sentence by sentence. This scrutiny brings to light the importance of language and its 
essentiality for understanding communication and barriers to this communication. It is at 
times evident that Khan is not only addressing his readers, but also Singer, Hashwani, 
and Badiou. While KOS is not without its own shortcomings, its author’s trenchant 
ability to find flaws in each of the pieces he presents, while enjoyable, often make it 
difficult to discern the real gist of his message: theory needs to admit “values garnered 
from the past, ethics and therefore texts, local to the collectivity, that make its past come 
alive” (Abstract). Otherwise, globalisation, as depicted by Singer, much like colonisation 
before it, is merely the subjugation of the universe or a vast part of it to a certain people’s 
language, customs, ideas and laws before which all are to bow down. 
We read KOS essentially as a piece about the exchange of information or ideas in 
today’s “globalised” yet multicultural world. Given that in KOS Khan, an academic, 
frames his understanding and response to Singer’s message as a Pakistani, we feel it 
especially necessary as examiners of the KOS writing to define who we are. In 
understanding this piece, the fact that we are students and researchers of economics is far 
less fundamental—perhaps even inconsequential—than the fact that we are both an 
Easterner and a Westerner, one of us Turkish, one of us American. As coauthors, we do 
not eschew this significant personal difference and the boundary it presents. Rather, we 
accept this separation of experience as a necessary foundation from which to proceed 
with this examination. It is this reality that proved most fruitful in both understanding and 
misunderstanding KOS.4 Even as Khan’s purpose is to shed light on, interpret, and, if 
possible, understand three pieces that are at times not altogether clear, our intent is, in 
part, to do the same in regard to his own—at times puzzling and abstruse—essay. Our 
other aim is to take the KOS analysis a step further. We believe it fails to develop a 
critique of Singer’s book as an espousal of a “universal” language and an ideology of 
asymmetric power uncomfortably similar to the Orientalist thought of the 19th century. 
Because we find this analysis lacking in KOS, we undertake an effort to approach 
Singer’s work from the viewpoint of two seemingly disparate scholars: Said and 
Dostoyevsky. 
As our motivating source for this exegesis is KOS, our format for this essay is 
similar to its format. We divide our work into three main sections, each specifically 
devoted to the KOS texts of Hashwani, Singer and Badiou respectively. Our approach, 
and ultimately our goal, in every section is to better understand Khan’s composition and 
thereby develop it in a more precise context. A final section to our essay presents an 
alternative globalisation narrative (alternative to that of Singer) drawn from our readings 
of KOS, Said and more importantly, Dostoyevsky. 
 
4It is worth mentioning that misunderstanding this piece often proved more revealing. We suspect Khan 
would find our confusion at least slightly satisfying. 
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2.  KHAN ON HASHWANI: LOCAL COMMUNICATION WITH  
GLOBAL SCOPE 
KOS begins with a detailed inspection of a letter written by the Chairman of Pearl 
Continental Hotels, Sudruddin Hashwani, to guests of his 5-star hotels in Pakistan. We 
find KOS’s treatment of Hashwani and his five-star welcome amusing, perplexing and 
intriguing all at once. Khan’s principle use of this piece is to establish a plane on which to 
read Singer. Economics, an arena not foreign to Khan (at least not in theoretical training), 
plays a key role in the development of this plane. 
Beginning with Hashwani’s text, we deduce certain main characteristics. KOS 
points out that this piece is a communication between the affluent, a message relayed 
from the bourgeoisie of Pakistan to certain “haves” from the rest of the world at a luxury 
hotel. But we see an important point here: the content of the text nearly exclusively 
concerns Pakistan, and the pledge of allegiance is dedicated to the Pakistani people. Even 
though the problems the text alludes to are global in nature (today’s chaotic world) the 
solutions Hashwani prescribes are all in relation to the nation-state of Pakistan—the 
space of nation building with an emphasised local scope. 
Khan is painstakingly critical of Hashwani and only more critical of himself as he 
questions his own worth as an examiner of Hashwani’s words. What is the value of 
Khan’s judgment? Khan poses this and other strong questions to none other than himself. 
We applaud this self-critical examination. He leaves the chore of answering these 
questions to his readers and demonstrates that he is not unaware of the self-imposed 
difficulty in his method of explication: “I have got myself stymied by treating the simple 
as complex, by looking for a theorem, or an empirical regularity, when all that is being 
offered is a definition...And there really is no end to this” (I(a)). No, there is not an end to 
this. Shrewdly, KOS reveals that Hashwani, however deeply he may feel about 
forestalling an impending doom, never intended any reader of his letter to be as critical of 
its semantic content and its meaning. 
But we have already overlooked the essential part of KOS’s treatment of 
Hashwani.  It is the enigmatic style of its author to include a fundamental—perhaps even 
the most salient—point of the Hashwani critique in parenthesis.5 Khan calls attention to 
the fact that even if he limits himself to the “economic register” (one in which his training 
is admittedly “excellent”), as a means of analysis, this only serves to highlight in the 
strongest way his own “lack of understanding” (I(a)). Strangely, the result (by an 
economist) of using economics as an instrument to elucidate a simple claim is confusion. 
Why this result is important in the KOS disquisition is not readily evident at this point of 
the essay. It might be easy to dismiss this as its author indulging in his self-inflicted 
confusion—of which we are to see much more. Yet what is this worth? 
Perhaps KOS criticises and discredits many of Hashwani’s suggestions fairly 
easily because their aim and style are too familiar to its author. Even after all his games 
with economics and language, Khan returns to the truth that Hashwani and he “belong to 
the same community and it is this” that leads Khan to understand his aims (I(c)), not a 
detailed—albeit very clever—dissection of Hashwani’s statements. Does this imply that 
 
5This is a point we both overlooked upon our first reading of the essay. It is also curious to Khan’s 
Delphic style to include significant remarks within his footnotes, which might deserve a special consideration 
all themselves. 
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Hashwani’s text is largely unintelligible to a non-Pakistani? Our own inclination is that 
because Khan shares the same language, history, and, in a largely uneasy manner, the 
same community, Khan can interpret and translate the motivations and the urgings of 
Hashwani. Khan has, in a sense, had the acquaintance of these arguments before. Nothing 
drives this point home more clearly than Khan’s ability to concisely sum up Hashwani’s 
text in Section I(d). Hashwani’s canvas is three paragraphs; Khan’s is a single sentence. 
And yet, Khan’s summary is in no way incomplete.6  
 
3. KHAN ON SINGER: TRANSLATION INDETERMINACY,  
A LANGUAGE OF DOMINATION 
While the content and argument of Hashwani’s letter is not altogether acceptable 
from Khan’s point of view, it is clearly understandable to Khan. The Singer case, 
however, presents a more perplexing, even disturbing, scenario for Khan. While we did 
not fail to see the irony in Hashwani’s discussing solutions to poverty in a five-star hotel, 
we, once more, do not fail to enjoy the irony in a classically trained economist feeling 
stripped of his own “sense of self” and “basic dignity” by Singer’s “appeal to a universal 
solvent of reason and of rationality” (II). Through our own discussions, as an Easterner 
and Westerner (Ilhan and Sean respectively) we reached more clarity on what we at first 
viewed only as ironic. In this interpretation we were much aided by the work of Edward 
Said.7 
In contrast to Hashwani’s text, Singer’s work is not an offering to guests at a 
Pakistani hotel, rather a bequest to the whole world. Ironically, what Singer proposes, and 
the language he utilises in doing so, is at one level intelligible and even familiar to Khan, 
(Singer after all employs terminology widely used in basic economic textbooks). But 
ultimately, Singer is not speaking Khan’s language. So while the concept of rationality 
and “standard economics models” (II(b)) are not foreign to Khan, the conclusions Singer 
draws from them certainly are. Khan appears quite put off and puzzled by Singer’s 
deductions because they are not readily translatable or interpretable to him. Like the 
decrees of universal truth, which by definition and their very nature can be neither 
reinterpreted nor questioned, we see Khan finding Singer’s text impenetrable and 
untranslatable because the language itself is not local and Singer’s work is presented as a 
global narrative, an eternal truth resting above time and place. If Khan’s bewilderment at 
reading Hashwani’s letter seems somehow contrived or manufactured, and thereby less 
genuine, with Singer’s piece his confusion is much more authentic. 
KOS depicts an aversion for Singer’s global remedy, often reaching the realm of 
revulsion, causing its author to flaunt and brandish his own economic credentials. “And 
when all else fails, the text utters the magic words principle of diminishing marginal 
utility. But are there not issues relating to cardinal utility, to the impossibility of an 
interpersonal comparison of tastes, the pervasiveness of non-convexities” (II(a)). 
 
6Mark Twain once claimed, “Few sinners are saved after the first ten minutes of a sermon”. Mr Twain, 
who once rewrote a section of James F. Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans, using less than half the number of 
words, would no doubt appreciate Khan’s effort. See Twain (1962). 
7We feel obligated to state upfront that while Khan makes only a cryptic footnote reference to Said, we 
find a discussion of Said’s work on “Orientalism” indispensable for analysing the issues KOS raises. This, no 
doubt, returns to the nature of our separate backgrounds. 
Global Solvent Versus Local Interpretation 307
Footnotes casually direct readers interested in so enlightening themselves on these 
concepts of marginal returns and non-convexities to other works by Khan himself and 
even Eatwell’s Palgrave Dictionary. KOS’s main purpose here is to demonstrate—
perhaps to Singer mostly—that Singer employs an instrument (economics) for which he 
lacks a requisite understanding. Khan might not have needed to react so cholerically in 
making his point. Yes, Singer—and perhaps even many economists—have little or no 
understanding of cardinal utility, or implications of non-convex utility functions. As 
Khan asks: at what level are we then to proceed? 
Singer’s imaginative examination (referred to as voodoo in KOS) perhaps 
originates from the idea of European identity as superior to those born out of non-
European peoples and cultures. Khan, knowing the dangers and the cost to the East of the 
Orientalist rhetoric is, we think, quick to identify that Singer presents repackaged 
Orientalism, where local values and cultures are brushed aside in the name of the abstract 
shapes of rationality and reason. The Western intellectual already well versed in the art of 
making his values the values of the whole global community is engaged in another such 
pursuit. But he is not even aware of it. As a preventive measure KOS includes 
Hashwani’s letter to contrast a global text with a local one, and clearly show that, in 
terms of language, Hashwani is more open, more sincere, more self-aware and therefore 
more easily understood than Singer. There are similarities of style in their two pieces but 
not of discourse. We claim that the Hashwani text communicates in a language, however 
feeble, whereas the Singer text dictates the truth. With Singer there is no communication 
between relative equals, only dictation among unequals. 
The very essence of translation is to take something foreign and make it one’s 
own, something existing in a particular time and place. But Singer’s religion or narrative 
tries to transcend both time and place. In this sense, it represents more of what Said calls 
a one-sided translation or even an instruction (for its own benefit) seeking to transmute, 
divide, deploy, schematise, tabulate, index, and displace living reality.8 A narrative like 
this that resists translation, one that strives to become a global text and works to undo 
spatial, religious and cultural limitations will, of course, fail to communicate. It will, as 
every religion does, put forth universal maxims and ask that people, for their own self-
benefit, obey and believe in them. In other words, in the name of rationality or reason 
(the modern gods) it will dominate over the populations of the world, bringing them 
together forcefully in the name of self-interest. 
It is here that we call special attention to the Dostoyevsky citation with which we 
began this essay and which we continue below. In our reading of KOS we never intended 
or anticipated delving into the literary realm—least of all, Russian literature. However, as 
if dictated by serendipity, if not fate, we recently found ourselves discussing The 
Possessed and the following passage in particular. Its relevance and appropriateness to 
the specific criticism found in KOS struck us at once. For this reason we feel it warrants 
inclusion in this work and a few brief comments. 
When gods begin to be common to several nations the gods are dying and the 
faith in them, together with the nation themselves. The stronger a people the 
more individual their god. There never has been a nation without a religion, 
 
8See Said (2000, pp. 106-107). 
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that is, without an idea of good and evil, and its own good and evil. When the 
same conceptions of good and evil become prevalent in several nations, then 
these nations are dying, and then the very distinction between good and evil is 
beginning to disappear. Reason has never had the power to define good and 
evil, or even to distinguish between good and evil, even approximately; on the 
contrary, it has always mixed them up in a disgraceful and pitiful way; science 
has even given the solution by the fist. This is particularly characteristic of the 
half-truths of science, the most terrible scourge of humanity, unknown till this 
century, and worse than plague, famine, or war. A half-truth is a despot such 
as has never been in the world before. A despot that has its priests and its 
slaves, a despot to whom all do homage with love and superstition hitherto 
inconceivable, before which science itself trembles and cringes in a shameful 
way.9 
This brings to light a truth that scholars are often loath to admit: our ideas, in 
whose uniqueness and newness we frequently delight, are sometimes new manifestations 
of older mental conceptions expounded long ago by others, often more brilliant than 
ourselves. We do not, however, see this as diminishing the value of Khan’s thought. 
Quite the contrary is true: Khan and Dostoyevsky, scholars of different fields and 
separated by over 100 years, reach strikingly similar—if not exact—conclusions as they 
carry on a dialog to which there is no end.10 In this we find great value supporting 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s claim: 
There is neither a first nor a last word and there are no limits to the dialogic 
context (it extends into the boundless past and the boundless future). Even past 
meanings, that is, those born in the dialogue of past centuries, can never be stable 
(finalised, ended once and for all)—they will always change (be renewed) in the 
process of subsequent development of the dialogue.11  
In The Possessed, Dostoyevsky speaks out against the nihilist and insidious 
influences he saw invading Russian life, language, and culture from Europe.12 
Dostoyevsky viewed the incipient revolutionary movement in his country as a result of 
the divorce of the educated classes from the masses. The book represents a prophetic 
anticipation of the evolutionary events there in 1917. Even a casual reader of this 
fictional novel is aware that it is a vehicle of the author’s political and philosophical 
beliefs and opinions. There is little of the scholarly and objective in The Possessed. 
Rather, as Avrahm Yarmolinsky claims, it is a book begotten of fear and wrath whose 
author was alarmed, most of all, that the individual, whose needs are of a spiritual and 
irrational order, must be degraded in a Socialist society—one organised according to a 
reasoned scheme in the interest of the group.13 
 
9See Dostoyevsky (1961, p. 268). 
10And in all fairness to Khan, he never makes a claim to the uniqueness of his ideas. 
11See Bakhtin (2001, front cover). 
12In fact, Dostoyevsky, who spent four years in penal exile in Siberia, began writing this novel years 
later while living in Dresden but could not bring himself to finish it there, finding Europe a second and worse 
exile. He eventually returned to Russia to complete the work. 
13See Yarmolinsky’s Forward to the Modern Library’s 1936 edition of The Possessed. 
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KOS reacts with great alarm to similar nefarious encroachments from the 
Occidental once more. Singer’s “universal solvent” is an example of such an 
encroachment. “What precisely does this text want to dissolve with its magic solution?” 
he asks (II(c)). In this light, it is not surprising that there is a familiar ring to the ideas of 
Khan, a Pakistani mathematical economist, and Dostoyevsky, a Russian fictional 
author.14 There is an uncanny correspondence to their renunciations. In the KOS analysis, 
Singer might be thought of as Dostoyevsky’s character, Stephan Verhovensky, the 
idealised intellectual Westerner fond of clever French phrases who fancies himself 
endowed with profound wisdom and eventually accedes to the “religion of the masses”. 
This unilateral translation offered to the masses as a singular solution can only be 
sustained, however, if one demonstrates that this new language (the language Singer 
implies and Dostoyevsky’s characters faithfully employ) is of an incomparably higher 
order than the language of every individual. This is Singer’s goal when he attempts to 
bring into focus the dichotomy between the local and the global, between the particular 
and the universal. Of course these grand claims of rationality and reason create certain 
problems of communication between different cultures; but this is not the worst of it. 
Khan is dumbfounded with Singer not only because he evokes fallacious claims 
regarding universality, making a mere mention of required assumptions, but more 
importantly because he, in his ethics theory, conveniently omits (if he is even aware of 
their existence) the limitations of economic thought. It is a curious and undeniable fact of 
economic theory that its theorems require assumptions in order to be proven. Not without 
significance, these assumptions are also referred to as constraints, and are often more 
important than the theorems they support. Ignoring this verity, Singer overreaches his 
conclusions. What reach for the Universal has not fallen short? We are left once more 
with the irony that a distinguished professor in economics has to remind Singer, who is 
after all classically trained in ethics, of the limitations of economic thought. Singer, like 
an undergraduate economics student, has understood much of the economic theory but 
none of its limitations. We largely attribute this irony to a diametrical difference in 
thinking between the two scholars stemming from an idea put forward by Said that no 
one has ever devised a method for detaching the scholar from the circumstances of life, 
from the fact of his involvement (conscious or otherwise) with a class, a set of beliefs, a 
social position, or from the mere activity of being a member of a society.15 
The language of domination, the overreaching of the Western intellectual who tries 
to establish his version of rationality and reason as universal principles, the alteration of 
the meaning of sentences, the economics of unilateral communication (which usually is a 
language of cognitive or physical violence) is, of course, no stranger to the Oriental 
subject. Khan, as an Easterner, is quite familiar with Said’s outlook on the relationship 
between Occident and Orient as one of power, domination, and varying degrees of 
hegemony. Said himself is conscious of the spirit of Orientalism, the spirit of a dominant 
ideology destroying the remnants of every local difference in an effort to rule more 
absolutely, one day returning to Western Universities. If one carefully reads Orientalism, 
 
14We are reminded here that by the time Dostoyevsky had graduated from a military engineering school 
(to which he was sent), he had decided upon literature as a career. For more on Doskoyevsky’s history see E. 
Simmons’ introduction to The Possessed (1961). 
15See Said (2000, p. 76). 
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Said’s 1978 critical perspective of the hidden ways in which power operates through the 
culture of empire, one sees that what he criticises most wholly in the Orientalist discourse 
is that this kind of discourse arrests it—the Oriental subject—at a certain time and place 
in the past, and does not allow the Oriental subject to modernise and to find for itself its 
position in the modern world.16 It also sums up and collects the Oriental subject under a 
single unit, a single description, choosing to forget the individual and the local 
characteristics of the Oriental subject. These properties of the Orientalist discourse are 
not randomly assigned, however; they all have something to do with the fact that 
Orientalism was the intellectual appendage, the ideology par excellence of the colonialist 
period. Any flaws in scientific approach or mistakes in data analysis were not errors but 
rather necessary negative externalities caused by the fact that Orientalism was not a 
science but an ideology—one most useful to the colonialist rulers when they administered 
and controlled local populations. 
The Orientalist discourse helped the colonialist to subject the local to his rule in 
two main ways. First, it arrested the local culture in scientific analysis, making it mute, 
objectifying it and making it part of the dead objects that science examines. This 
dehumanising side of Orientalism was found repugnant by Said because it assumed away 
the fact that the Oriental subject could actually talk for himself and was not dead but in 
constant flux and full of life. But in order for the asymmetric exchange and relation 
between the colonialist and the locals to continue, the relation required a simplification to 
one between an active omnipotent subject and a passive mute object. According to Said, 
the oriental discourse, in effect, waged this war on an intellectual level, objectifying the 
local population.   
A second manner of subjugation, according to Said, is also related to the 
colonialist dream of ruling over a passive race. By overlooking local differences, by 
failing to respect the local cultures and their unique value, the Orientalist created a 
passive and muted population, uniform and undifferentiated in the eyes of the colonial 
powers, valueless by themselves, only valuable for the functions they performed for the 
imperial powers.17  Starting from Rome, no empire has ruled by diversifying; all have 
ruled by aggregating and homogenising under the yoke of a single master whom all must 
obey. This, what we might term ideological science, was also very effective for taking 
the ground from underneath local resistances to imperialism. The colonialist, who was 
supposedly deciding the well being of the whole empire, was acting rationally; the local, 
who often found the policies against his individual benefit, was, of course, acting 
irrationally. But, if the population was one and the same, the policy was either just for 
everybody or unjust for everybody. Said gives a cold example of the self-confidence of 
the colonialist strengthened by Orientalist propaganda when he says that his outlook was: 
“How could even the Eastern people object to such grand benefits for all?”18 A strong 
disdain for the individual rationality of the local, a strong unspoken assumption of perfect 
information about what is best for the common people, and a hatred for democracy for 
the other were the main properties of this asymmetric power relationship between the 
imperialist and the lands it ruled. 
 
16See Said (1979, p. 105). 
17See Said (1979, pp. 94-95). 
18See Said (2000, p. 122). 
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Said was a member of the repressed and muted Oriental population. He witnessed 
the discriminatory side of Western powers, and lived through the dehumanising side of 
the Western crusade of modernisation of the non-European. Taking into account the fact 
that Orientalism did change Said’s life (and all those coming from the Orient to the 
Western World) by directly influencing how he would be perceived and classified, is not 
to emphasise the personal side of Orientalism. In fact, for all the personal animosity Said 
harbored against Orientalism, he was not criticising the Orientalism from the perspective 
of a personally damaged Oriental subject, but from the viewpoint of a world-renowned 
thinker. This point might seem arbitrary, but it is not. Simply by authoring a book 
challenging the basic tenets of Orientalism, by competing with the Orientalist discourse 
on an equal intellectual plane in an esteemed Western university, by exposing the 
mystifications and power games that were the essence of Orientalist science, Said 
rejected the Orientalist discourse not only in theory but also in practice. By refusing to be 
tied down, by refusing to be silenced, by showing that an Oriental subject could have its 
independent voice in the academic universe, Said was falsifying the main assumptions of 
the Orientalist ideology.  
In this manner, Khan, entering the intellectual debate on globalisation, also takes a 
similar approach to the ethics of Singer. As an economist, Khan strives to prove that 
Singer’s economic tools are not only wrongly applied in an economic sense, but that 
Singer, attempting to create objective knowledge (much like the Orientalists) creates a 
subjective method more in the light of global imperialism or social engineering. This 
cannot be overstated, especially since it is exactly what Singer claims to stay safely clear 
of when he says: “But one cannot argue that the religious faith of people of a different 
culture is false, while upholding a religious faith of one’s own that rests on no firmer 
ground. That really would be cultural imperialism”. Khan, once again, deals with this 
important reference to what “really” is cultural imperialism only in a footnote, 
claiming—perhaps not dishonestly—that he cannot summon the requisite “self-
reflexivity” to tackle such an issue.19 Singer displays a commitment to what economist 
John K. Galbraith called technical and institutional imperialism—believing that what 
works brilliantly in one country must surely work in others.20 
Feeling a threat to his cherished values of ethics and religious diversity by Singer’s 
espoused Universal Solvent and Universal Ethics, Khan demonstrates the intellectual and 
scientific bankruptcy of the universality that Singer gives so much importance to. But, 
like Said, he does so as a scholar. By answering Singer here as an economist rather than a 
Muslim, by utilising familiar economic references, Khan refutes the Singer text. He 
refutes it not only in theory but also in practice. 
The fact that the Orientalist discourse always answers more questions than it asks 
is both a cause and a symptom of its unilateral manner of engaging non-European 
antiquity. In this manner, it is not like the student—ever curious—but like a teacher—
ever impatient with its pupils. KOS, in its quizzical fashion, turns this traditional 
Orientalist mode upside-down, refusing to follow the same formula. Asking more 
questions than it answers, it represents the antithesis of Orientalist one-way exchange.   
 
19See KOS Footnote 73. 
20It is worth noting that Galbraith developed this idea while serving as US Ambassador to India during 
the Kennedy administration.  See Galbraith (1977). 
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4.  KHAN ON BADIOU: A PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE 
We begin this section with a confession: it is not entirely clear to us what purpose 
the Badiou text serves for KOS or even exactly how it significantly contributes to the 
piece other than to perplex and confuse—our own ignorance provided some problems at 
this point that no amount of discussion was able to relieve. This, to us, is the most 
ambiguous part of KOS. Khan’s aim (if we might call it that) is to show that philosophy, 
were it able to “awake and do its duty, fulfil what is required of it, deliver on its promise, 
redeem its desire” (III(b)), is also not the global solvent nor will it supplant its “foul 
potency”.  There is not a single answer, a single solution to the “current chaos” in our 
globalised world. There are many ways, which cannot and will not be supplanted by 
rational economic thought (whatever one’s interpretation of such a phrase), philosophy 
finding itself, or any other candidates. If anything, KOS is not critical enough of Badiou 
also creating or invoking philosophy to universally interrupt or retard the globe from 
themes of “liberal economy” and “representative democracy.”  
With Badiou, KOS maintains its critical emphasis on the importance of language 
as the site on which battles of meaning are fought. “How am I to translate these words, 
Badiou’s words, so that I can understand to some extent, if not precisely, what it is that he 
is saying,” Khan asks himself and his readers once more (III(a)). But ultimately, KOS 
does not develop a strong position for or against Badiou’s work. Our interpretation of this 
essay—and of translation—attributes heavy emphasis to local versus global and East 
versus West. It is for this reason that Footnote 87 of KOS practically jumps from its 
sequestered place of insignificance at the bottom of the page: “In any case, the question 
remains as to how Badiou looks on the origins of his thoughts. Does he think of himself, 
for example, as a ‘man of the East’?”21 
We find more value in the “singular,” artistic creation, which Badiou mentions, 
than in his espoused uber-philosophy. We focus singularly, if we might borrow from 
Badiou, on Dostoyevsky’s own artistic conceptions that demonstrate two or more 
converging tales and multiple voices that reinforce one another by means of contrast, 
much like the musical principle of polyphony. In this way, Dostoyevsky presented a new 
form of the European novel. Valuing truth in art, he created characters so rich, so 
separate, so individual and all possessing trembling voices ablaze with the fire of 
fanaticism (be it religious, atheist, socialist, or otherwise). His heroes, his fools, and his 
panting fiends, with mania for destruction, lie side by side on a plane of interaction and 
coexistence. They are so fully fleshed out and independent that they passionately believe 
in totally incongruent and irreconcilable views. (Take for example Alyosha and Ivan 
from The Brothers Karamazov, or Pyotr Stepanovitch and his father Stepan from The 
Possessed.) Bakhtin points out that this incongruity was not an accident of Dostoyevsky 
but rather a natural end result based on the novelist’s life-view.22 
Dostoyevsky gave particular importance to interaction, interdependence, and 
coexistence of characters on multiple social levels. Bakhtin also states that for 
Dostoyevsky the “importance of dialogue, the form of a conversation or a quarrel where 
various points of view can dominate in turn and reflect the diverse nuances of 
 
21Footnotes like this are easy to miss, even significant ones. 
22See Bakhtin (1984) for more on this discussion. 
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contradictory nuances is especially important.”23 But what Dostoyevsky does not offer is 
a universal panacea; the plurality of consciousness he constructs cannot be reduced to a 
single and dominant ideological common denominator. The great novelist himself saw 
human exchanges and human dialog as an integral part of his contribution to the canon of 
European literature. He accepted the essential divergence and incompatibility of different 
local views as a natural consequence of separate historical experiences of people of 
different nations. In rejecting the domination of one view or ideology over others, he 
worked in what we call the artistic space, one orthogonal to the space of both Badiou and 
Singer. 
 
5.  CONCLUDING COMMENT 
As KOS finally returns to the motivations for its own abstract and speaks of 
“regional cooperation” and the “ethics of globalisation” (IV), we return to the main 
issue of sustainable coexistence in a world of many religions and many ideologies. Is 
this coexistence possible?  It is only here that Khan reminds his readers of a 
religious—Muslim to be more specific—belief that reflects the Pakistani way. We 
identify with the Dostoyevskian view of the modern world that a peaceful and 
sustainable existence cannot be found via a universal solvent to remove, cut through 
or somehow transcend all our differences. This is because these differences cannot be 
ignored. Indeed, our differences, regional independence, and conflict of view will not 
dissipate with globalisation. They are here to stay; and many will indeed become 
more pronounced.   
Our analysis has shown how traces of Orientalism, and its essential 
dehumanising aspect, remain even in contemporary intellectual discourses and Western 
thought. The language employed today might have changed to incorporate newer 
aphorisms (like global economics) but the basic stance is still the same. This is not by 
accident and raises a larger proposition for future research depicting how the 
Orientalist discourse has adapted to the world of the 21st century, and especially 
contemporary events, specifically via economic notions and maxims. Such an 
examination would necessarily involve going beyond the texts to events, putting 
oneself more appropriately into the stream of “current chaos.”  Amit Chaudhuri, in an 
essay in the London Review of Books, recently underscored this same idea.  He notes 
that the Orientalist culture of power “is now so familiar that it’s easily taken for 
granted. This would be foolish—Eurocentrism is alive and well, and takes new and 
unexpected forms in every political epoch.”24  
This idea is inextricably linked to the fact that the times in which an individual 
lives influence his writings. As authors, we are no less immune to this effect. Our paper, 
connecting the “Orientalisms” of today to the imperialists discourse from 200 years ago, 
reminds us that there is benefit to keeping open a conversation with the great thinkers of 
the past (Dostoyevsky, Said) because their theories are often still applicable today, 
perhaps even more applicable. Just as historical discourses never completely end, 
Dostoyevsky was always wary of finishing his own novels because as long as a work 
 
23See Bakhtin (1984, p. 16). 
24See Chaudhuri (2006, p. 1). 
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remained multi-leveled and multi-voiced, as long as the people in it were still arguing, 
then the despair over the absence of a solution would not set in.25 
We conclude by saying that, following in the footsteps of Said, and even Khan, 
during the writing of this paper we tried to practice the kind of global communication we 
advocate. That is to say, one where differences are acknowledged, not smashed, one by 
the other. Both of us tried to work out what we found engaging in the texts. This resulted 
in individual or local interpretations. When there was a rift between the authors (and 
there were, of course, many, given our divergent backgrounds and separate skills) we did 
not seek to impose a single narrative, but accepted the separation between our unmerged 
realities. The task was a reconciliation of separate interests and imperatives, not a 
dismissal of them. By not overplaying our differences, and by not overlooking them 
either, we reached an understanding between admittedly biased equals. Thus we present 
the product of constant dialogue and intellectual conversation between a Muslim and a 
Christian, between a former US Naval officer and a Turk. And the differences do not end 
there. 
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